Tiskane izdaje
"It shouldn't be overstated that this was the deciding factor, or even a principal factor" in the decision to intervene in Libya, Benjamin J. Rhodes, a senior aide who joined in the meeting, said in late March. But, he added, the effect on Iran was always included in the discussion. "The ability to apply this kind of force in the region this quickly - even as we deal with other military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan - combined with the nature of this broad coalition sends a very strong message to Iran about our capabilities, militarily and diplomatically."
The Obama team holds no illusions about Colonel Qaddafi's long-term importance. Libya is a sideshow. Containing Iran's power remains their central goal in the Middle East.
Every decision is being examined under the prism of how it will affect the administration's regional strategy: how to slow Iran's nuclear progress, and speed the arrival for a successful uprising there. In fact, the Iran debate makes every such chess move in the region more complicated. At the end of this era of upheaval, which the White House considers as sweeping as the changes that transformed Europe after the Berlin Wall fell, success or failure may well be judged by the question of whether Iran realizes its ambitions to become the region's most powerful force.
But things changed with the arrival of the Arab Spring. Suddenly the Arab authoritarians who had spent the last two years plotting with Washington to squeeze the Iranians became more worried about their own streets than Iran. So when the White House sees the region through a Persian lens, what does it look like?
THE LIBYA LESSON
Mr. Obama argued, in a speech on March 28, that Libya presented a special case - an urgent moral responsibility to protect Libyans being hunted down by the Qaddafi forces and a moment of opportunity to make a difference with what the president called "unique" American capabilities. (Translation: a multitude of technologies, like Tomahawk missiles, reconnaissance and electronic jamming.) Those are the same capabilities that would be critical in any attack on Iranian nuclear sites. The administration's top officials knew that a demonstration of that ability would not be lost on Iran. "You could argue it either way," said one official who was involved in the Libya debate and spoke on the condition of anonymity. "Maybe it would encourage them to do what they have failed to do for years: come to the negotiating table. But you could also argue that it would play to the hard-liners, who say the only real protection against America and Israel is getting a bomb, and getting it fast."
THE ARAB ALLY CARD
The Saudis see Iran as the biggest threat to their own regional ambitions, and have cooperated in many American-led efforts to hem in Tehran. Yet relations between Washington and Riyadh have rarely been as strained: To King Abdullah, President Obama's decision to not back President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was a sign of weakness, and a warning that he might abandon Saudi leadership if democracy demonstrations took root there. Perhaps that explains why there was barely a peep from the White House when the Saudis rolled troops into neighboring Bahrain to help put down the Shiite-majority protests there.
THE SYRIAN PUZZLE
For years the United States has tried in vain to peel Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, away from Iran and to reconcile with Israel. It fears that if his government collapses, chaos will reign, making Syria unpredictable as well as dangerous. But in recent weeks the White House has concluded that it has much less to lose than the Iranians. If protesters succeed in Syria, Iran could be next.
ISRAEL 'S OPTIONS
Inside Israel, a debate has resumed about how long the Israelis can afford to put off dealing with the problem themselves, fed by fears that Iran's reaction to the region's turmoil might be a race for the bomb. That could lead to the worst outcome for Mr. Obama - a war between Iran and Israel- and that consideration leaves little room for error.
